Saving the Scientific Phenomena

Abstract

To a great extent, the recent renaissance in the metaphysics of science has been spurred by an interest in the nature of causal powers (dispositions, capacities, tendencies, etc.). In particular, a number of authors have made realism about powers a cornerstone of their interpretations of scientific knowledge (for example, in developing accounts of scientific realism, inter alia). Against the backdrop of an admiration for the explanatory power of powers in this domain, this paper strikes a cautionary note. Is the existence of irreducible powers a commitment that is entailed by taking scientific practice seriously? I consider two approaches to this question: the first concerning the putative requirement of dispositional properties in the context of scientific explanation; the second concerning the putative requirement of these properties in the context of scientific abstraction. Neither, I contend, entails an ontological commitment to powers. This negative, interim conclusion suggests that inferences to the existence of causal powers in scientific contexts are ultimately independent of the science adduced; rather; they are a function of substantive philosophical commitments regarding time-honored disputes between realists and empiricists more generally, about issues such as how trade-offs between ontological commitment and explanatory capacity are properly made. In the philosophical domain, however, the realist has an advantage. For realism about powers better accords with an arguably scientistic consideration of the identities of scientific properties. Thus, interim conclusion notwithstanding, it would seem that powers can do something important for the philosopher of science after all.