Abstract
Abstract This chapter compares the findings of the book’s three case studies. It shows that for Saudi Arabia, regional leadership was not optional, whereas taking on a prominent role in regional affairs involved more choice for Emirati and Qatari leaders. The latter perceived significant threats to their security, but their regional foreign policies were more obviously driven by ambitions to elevate their small states’ status within the region and beyond. The chapter further summarizes how the three countries’ assessments about what drove instability in the MENA during the 2010s differed considerably, even as they all saw the region collapse into a general state of disorder; and it outlines how their ideas of what kind of order could yield stability—i.e. an environment in which they felt secure enough domestically and able to protect and pursue their regional interests as freely as possible—consequently described three different versions of the MENA.
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