Satisfactory content delivery scheme for QoS provisioning in delay tolerant networks

Abstract

SummaryWe deal in this article with the content forwarding problem in delay tolerant networks (DTNs). We first formulate the content delivery interaction as a noncooperative satisfaction game. On one hand, the source node seeks to ensure a delivery probability above some given threshold. On the other hand, the relay nodes seek to maximize their own payoffs. The source node offers a reward (virtual coins) to the relay, which caches and forwards the file to the final destination. Each relay has to solve the dilemma of accepting/rejecting to cache the source's file. Cooperation incurs energy cost due to caching, carrying, and forwarding the source's file. Yet when a relay accepts to cooperate, it may receive some reward if it succeeds to be the first relay to forward the content to the destination. Otherwise, the relay may receive some penalty in the form of a constant regret; the latter parameter is introduced to make incentive for cooperation. Next, we introduce the concept of satisfaction equilibrium (SE) as a solution concept to the induced game. Now, the source node is solely interested in reaching a file delivery probability greater than some given threshold, while the relays behave rationally to maximize their respective payoffs. Full characterizations of the SEs for both pure and mixed strategies are derived. Furthermore, we propose two learning algorithms allowing the players (source/relays) to reach the SE strategies. Finally, extensive numerical investigations and some learning simulations are carried out to illustrate the behavior of the interacting nodes and to give some insightful thoughts on how to fine‐tune the network setting.