Sander, Gordon F. The Hundred Day Winter War: Finland's Gallant Stand against the Soviet Army (review)

Abstract

SEER, 93, 2, APRIL 2015 386 with these fascist movements, and at times were downright hostile. Whereas the Legion cultivated ties with parish priests and Orthodox laypeople, however, the Ustaša largely ignored nationalist Catholic lay movements and courted the Church hierarchy. Both were effectively secular movements, according to Dinu, but both cultivated strong cults of the dead, which he argues are a key element of fascist political religion. As with his treatment of violence, Dinu’s discussion of religion covers a lot of ground very quickly. He introduces the reader to the essential elements of the story and then dives straight into analysis, illustrating his arguments as he goes. The result is a much-needed comparison on two fascinating movements that emphasizes the importance of context and cautions against stereotyping the fascisms of southeastern Europe as ‘Balkan’ aberrations. History Department Roland Clark Eastern Connecticut State University Sander, Gordon F. The Hundred Day Winter War: Finland’s Gallant Stand against the Soviet Army. Modern War Studies. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2013. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $39.95. In filial piety, the author of this version of the Finnish Winter War lays his own love of history at the feet of his father. He was a military man of distinction and his son has chosen a desperate conflict to illustrate what war means in modern history. Gordon F. Sander does actually give what he calls a ‘cat’s cradle of interwoven political, diplomatic, military, and intellectual strands’ that were entangled in the realities and illusions of the Winter War. But this was ultimately the fabric under which the good-guys — the Finns — lost the war, a hefty piece of their country and 26,000 men at least. Was there no alternative to the carnage, 150,000 Russian and Finnish together in one hundred days, Sander records? Some Finns like Väinö Voionmaa, J. P. Salmenoja, Väinö Tanner, Urho Kekkonen and J. K. Paasikivi tried to think in terms of concessions to the Russians that would not upset the rest of the country. Well before the war broke out, Mannerheim had urged the cession of certain islands to Russia that would have eased their expressed concern about the defence of Leningrad. Mannerheim was even prepared to support, in the Russians’ favour, an adjustment of the land-frontier. Someofthis—andthese—arementionedinSander’stext.Butwhatislacking is the force of the power of the great con: how Germany encouraged Stalin to go for the Baltic States and as much of Finland as he wanted (or could get), while two years later Germany tried to knock the unsuspecting Soviet Union out. (Hitler was saving Britain for later in spite of a warning from Raeder.) In REVIEWS 387 any case, Finland was a side-feature of a wider bluff. After two more wars to try in vain to get its lost lands back, Finland had to settle for a recognition of its independence. This was more than the Baltic States were accorded. Sander’s work on the Winter War is to a significant degree a compendium both of Russian and Finnish material. In his treatment of the sleeplessness of both armies, the key is the lack of reserves. The utter weariness of the Finnish troops defending the last days in the Mannerheim Line as it began to break down makes Sander write in anger that the Finnish High Command would simply have done better had it taken the men out of the trenches. And while in general Sander is on the side of the Finns, there is plenty he finds critical in the behaviour of some of the Finnish brass. In particular, he notes that, in contrast to the situation in Moscow, the censorship authorities were antagonistic to foreign newsmen. As to newsmen, there were also newswomen. One was Martha Gellhorn, Hemingway’s girlfriend. Another was her friend, Virginia Cowles. Undoubtedly, theformerlady’sstatement,‘Ilikethosewhofight’,appliedtoherfriend’soutlook, too. In their reportage, they did not flinch. Gellhorn’s reporting had already been noted by Eleanor Roosevelt, but the President himself was not to be drawn into the battle, though his financial help for Finland raised a US loan (sic) from four million dollars to ten million...