Sanctioning Electoral Opposition: Repression and the Growth of German Social Democracy

Abstract

Elections and repression are complements under authoritarian governments, not substitutes. However, we know relatively little about the effects of repression on political parties and electoral outcomes. I argue that parties are an example of a hierarchical network, and can sustain collective action when leaders are removed by targeted repression. I illustrate this logic in the case of Germany, where from 1878-1890 some local governments expelled social democratic leaders from their home districts. I estimate the effects of expulsions on electoral outcomes using a difference-in-difference research design which leverages variation in their timing and severity. I find they diminished the SPD's success at the polls. However, effects were restricted to the first election post-expulsions. I find only weak evidence that this is due to declining numbers of socialists expelled over time within districts. These findings show that authoritarian repression of leaders significantly impedes the electoral success of opposition parties. However, they also suggest the robustness of unified, hierarchical networks to targeted repression.