Abstract
AbstractPricing and output decisions are often delegated to managers compensated on the basis of sales. Prior literature has shown that when firms are homogeneous, the delegation of pricing or output decisions to managers, compensated on the basis of sales, does not facilitate collusion. We show that when firms are heterogeneous, either in marginal cost or product quality, sales‐based compensation can facilitate collusion under both price and quantity competition. As a result, compensating managers on the basis of sales can increase firm profits and reduce consumer welfare. Additionally, we find that owners can strategically design managerial compensation structures to incentivize collusion between rival managers.
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