Abstract

Smart grid features real-time monitoring and control by integrating advanced communication networks into traditional power grids. This integration, however, makes smart grid vulnerable to cyber attacks, i.e., the anomalies caused by attackers in the communication network can affect ordinary operations of the power grid and result in severe physical damage. To protect smart grid from cyber attacks, many traditional countermeasures, such as message encryption, have been proposed to be directly migrated to fit this system. In this regard, the very first fundamental questions that need to be addressed are how to evaluate and compare the physical impacts of cyber attacks and countermeasures, and whether traditional cyber security countermeasures can result in satisfactory performance in smart grid. Motivated by these questions, we establish a small-scale smart grid prototype, and use both experiments and cross-domain simulations to evaluate and compare the reaction of the power system under cyber attacks, with and without the presence of traditional countermeasures. Our study reveals that traditional countermeasures can not be readily migrated to protect smart grid in particular, and shows that during system emergencies where prompt system reactions are critical, the extra latency caused by message encryption and decryption can result in more than 10 times in the magnitude of voltage collapse. Our work indicates that traditional countermeasures may not fit smart grid, the newly emerging cyber- physical system, which has strict time constraint. Therefore it is essential for researchers to seek solutions to address smart grid specific security threats.

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