Abstract

1. IntroductionIn May of 1987, driver Bobby Allison's car became airborne after blowing a tire in front stretch of Talladega Superspeedway in Alabama. car destroyed 100 feet of safety fencing and nearly entered densely packed grandstands at 210 miles per hour. As it was, debris from airborne car caused severe injuries, including loss of an eye by a spectator. Allison was not seriously injured, but National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) saw horrific possibilities and implemented a plan to slow down cars at its two fastest speedways: Talladega and Daytona track in Florida (Duskey 2001).NASCAR's solution was to mandate use of restrictor plates at these tracks. This device limits flow of air to car's engine, thereby reducing horsepower and, consequently, speed engine can generate. Since their introduction, restrictor plates have succeeded in reducing not only speeds reached during races, but also qualifying speeds. Prior to implementation of plates at Daytona and Talladega, qualifying speeds consistently exceeded 200 miles per hour (mph), reaching a high of 212.809 mph during qualifying session in which Allison's infamous takeoff occurred. Since then, qualifying speeds have never reached 200 mph and have actually declined so that in 2000 and 2001, qualifying speeds averaged just under 187 mph. Despite achieving objective of slowing down cars, use of restrictor plates has been controversial among drivers, many believing that their personal safety has been compromised. refrain from many NASCAR drivers is that during a restrictor-plate race, the big is inevitable, and hopefully no one will be seriously injured. Veteran Sterling Marlin voiced a common concern among NASCAR drivers after a last-lap crash at Talladega race in October 2001 eliminated 16 of 43 cars: They [restrictor plates] caused this and they'll continue to cause things like this until they [NASCAR officials] get them off cars. It's not safe and they better do something (Associated Press 2001).This article investigates empirical determinants of safety at NASCAR races, paying particular attention to effects of restrictor plates. No one debates that spectator safety is now greater; however, if, as drivers assert, their well-being is diminished, then NASCAR finds itself in unenviable situation of placing its product in jeopardy for safety of its fan base. What we seek to determine is whether, in fact, restrictor-plate racing is more hazardous than non-plate racing. We establish a model that evaluates not only relationship between restrictor plates and driver injuries, but also between plates and accidents on track. It may be case that what drivers are actually observing is more cars wrecking on track and not necessarily an increased threat to their personal safety. If this is case, then NASCAR may have happened upon a process for increasing fan interest in these races. When more cars wreck, viewership increases, while drivers themselves are not harmed. NASCAR veteran driver Bobby Labonte sarcastically summed this up, saying, The grandstands are full and everybody is OK, so I guess it's OK (Associated Press 2001).As we proceed with our analysis, section 2 examines highway safety literature and makes a connection with our NASCAR data. Section 3 details data, and section 4 sets up model describing number of wrecked cars. Section 5 expands model to evaluate driver injuries. Finally, we summarize our findings in section 6.2. Does Speed Kill or Does Variance Kill?Research into NASCAR safety can be seen as an extension of highway safety studies, although in a highly controlled or even artificial setting. NASCAR races provide experiments in risk and safety in addition to entertainment. data are cleaner than highway data, however, due to a number of differences. …

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call