Abstract

The reconfiguration technology, which is the significant feature of the newly designed Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) system, enables the transfer of avionics functions from the failed module to the residual normal module, thereby enhancing the robustness of the whole system. The basic target of the IMA reconfiguration is to ensure the safe flight and correct execution of the mission. To solve the problem of lack of effective management mechanism for the IMA system development and safety assessment, a safety analysis method based on STAMP/STPA and UPPAAL for IMA reconfiguration is proposed. The method focuses mainly on system characteristics and multiparty interactions. On the basis of this approach, some studies and analyses have been carried out. Firstly, the STAMP/STPA principle is studied and used to identify unsafe control actions in the reconfiguration process. Secondly, a formal model of IMA reconfiguration is developed using UPPAAL. Finally, the accessibility analysis of the formal model is used to analyze UCAs and the corresponding loss scenarios. The method enables a detailed description of the interactions between the components and a rigorous mathematical analysis of the system, thereby diluting the effect of human factors while ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the safety constraints.

Highlights

  • Integrated avionics, one of the three iconic technologies of the aircraft industry, is the “brain” and “nerve center” of the aircraft and a crucial system to ensure flight safety

  • The main methods used in ARP are traditional safety analysis methods, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), most of which are based on the event chain model, attributing the safety problem to reliability

  • It includes 4 steps: (i) The first step is to define the purpose of the analysis (ii) The second step is to build a model of the system called a control structure, which captures functional relationships and interactions by modeling the system as a set of feedback control loops. This control structure is based on the System Theory Accident Model and Process (STAMP) control model (iii) The third step is to analyze the control actions in the control structure, examining how they could lead to the losses defined in the first step (iv) The fourth step identifies the reasons why unsafe control might occur in the system

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Summary

Introduction

Integrated avionics, one of the three iconic technologies of the aircraft industry, is the “brain” and “nerve center” of the aircraft and a crucial system to ensure flight safety. After the 1980s, Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) was gradually developed and widely used in aircraft such as Airbus A380, Boeing B787, and COMAC C919. IMA reconfiguration, the significant technology of the next-generation DIMA system, effectively reduces hardware redundancy, and greatly strengthens the system flexibility and the ability to cope with different missions and resource failures [4, 5]. The main methods used in ARP are traditional safety analysis methods, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), most of which are based on the event chain model, attributing the safety problem to reliability. It is believed that the reliability of the system components can ensure system safety It finds the “root cause (component failure)” that directly leads to the accident based on the top-level events. The STPA method is combined with the formal model detection method based on Time Automata to dilute the effect of human factors

Literature Review
Preliminaries
Safety Assessment of the IMA System
Result
Safety Constraint Analysis
Conclusion
Full Text
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