Safeguarding South Sudan Permanent Constitution-Making Process: A Case for Redesign

Abstract

This article examines the permanent constitution-making process in South Sudan. Against the backdrop of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) designed process, the permanent constitution is expected to usher in a new democratic constitutional order. Anchored on the influential model of constitution making that gives precedent to public participation and to constituent assembly over other procedural choices, the process risks producing a worst-case outcome because it is vulnerable to both elite capture and explosion of violence. This paper argues that the designed permanent constitution-making process is unrealistic and may result in either authoritarian or unworkable constitution. Lumping together the process with peace accord implementation bludgeons the procedural choices. It makes the process susceptible to elite capture thereby limiting genuine public participation, exacerbating ethnic tensions and producing an unworkable constitution. The South Sudan permanent constitution-making process must transcend ARCSS lifespan, value procedural choices, mitigate ethnic tensions, and safeguard against elite capture.