Sadr al-Sharī'a's Criticisms of the Māturīdī Tradition in the Context of the Attribute of Takwīn

Abstract

The focus of this study is twofold. First, the figures who are highly representative of the Māturīdī tradition’s view in the discussions on the attribute of takwīn will be analysed. The purpose of this examination is not to reveal what the Māturīdī view of takwīn is. Instead, the aim is to trace Sadr al-Sharī‘a’s (d. 747/1346) criticisms of the Māturīdīs before him. After this, Sadr al-Sharī‘a’s approach will be presented, and his criticism of the earlier Māturīdīs and his solution will be presented. Since the Ash‘arite aspect of the subject is also central, the aspects of differentiation between the Māturīdīs and the Ash‘arites in the discussion of the attribute of takwīn will be mentioned first. The debate on takwīn stems from the disagreement over which attribute is the attribute through which God’s creation is realised. While the Māturīdīs accept that God’s creation is directly realised through the attribute of takwīn, the Ash‘arites think that it is realised through the attribute of power (al-qudra). The Māturīdīs’ belief that the attribute of power is insufficient for creation arises from the fact that they define power differently from the Ash‘arites. While the Ash‘arites define power as “the power to do something and the one who does it with his power”, the Māturīdīs define it as “the power to do something”. Hence, for the Ash‘arites, the presence of the attribute of power in the agent means realising the thing. In contrast, the Māturīdīs think that the presence of power is not enough, that power is the power to do the act, and that takwīn, an attribute other than power, is necessary for the realisation of the thing. The Ash‘arites objected that the attribute of takwīn, which is eternal according to the Māturīdīs’ acceptance, would require the created things to be eternal as well. The Māturīdīs, on the other hand, answered the objection by explaining that the attribute of creation, “takwīn, is eternal, and the act is created”. Sadr al-Sharī‘a, one of the theologians representing the later period of the Māturīdī School, proposed to address the issue through “states” (aḥwāl) due to the problems he saw in the tradition mentioned above’s explanations of the attribute of takwīn. According to him, like the attributes of essence, the attributes of action are also eternal. There is no problem in accepting the attributes of action as qadīm because they are the origin of action. While the origin of the act is the attribute of takwīn, which is eternal, acts are states that are expressed as “neither existing nor non-existent”. Sadr al-Sharī‘a’s criticism of the tradition he belongs to focuses on the fact that Māturīdī theologians are not aware of the distinction between acts and the attribute that is the origin of acts. “He thinks that the sentence, ‘Creation is eternal, and the act is created’, does not make sense, and states that God’s act in the sense of creation cannot be eternal since He is the fāil al-mukhtār. According to him, while there is no problem among the Māturīdīs about the eternity of essential attributes, there is ambiguity about the eternity of attributes of action. Therefore, he proposes that the actional attribute takwīn be accepted as the origin of actions. While the attribute of takwīn, which is the origin of the act, is eternal, the act in the sense of īqā' (ījāt) should be regarded as a state (neither existing nor non-existent). According to Sadr al-Sharī'a, the Māturīdīs who do not accept ījāt as a state are as mistaken as the Ash‘arīs who do not accept that the origin is eternal. Thus, by distinguishing between the origin of the act and the act, he justifies the view of fāil al-mukhtār and shows that contrary to the Ash‘arites’ claim, creation is realised by an attribute other than the attributes of will and power.