Sado-masochism in Buchanan’s Samaritan’s Dilemma: A Constitutional Perspective

Abstract

In this paper, we study the impact of altruism on an interaction between a Samaritan and a recipient/parasite in the frame of Buchanan’s Samaritan’s dilemma (1975). We show that, as soon as altruism reaches a certain threshold, the equilibrium of the game corresponds to the situation Buchanan called a Samaritan’s dilemma. We also show that the Nash equilibrium reached for these levels of altruism is a Pareto-efficient outcome. Thus, the situation Buchanan characterized as a Samaritan’s dilemma is not a dilemma at all. Both players are satisfied with the situation as it is and need each other, up to the point of giving birth to a sado-masochistic equilibrium. We also show that this result holds if and only if the constitutional rules are given—either the ethical rules followed by the individuals, or the form of the game. This equilibrium could be avoided if the players adopted a constitutional perspective on the situation.