Sa skya Pa\u1e47\u1e0dita\u2019s Classification of Arguments by Consequence Based on the Type of the Logical Reason: Editorial Conundrum and Mathematics for Commentators

Abstract

This paper examines a passage of the eleventh chapter of the Rigs gter of Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182–1251) on the division of arguments by consequence (thal ʾgyur) of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” with respect to the type of relation between P and Q. This passage appears in quite different versions in several available recensions of the Rigs gter, all of which are problematic to some extent. The different interpretations of the commentators can be shown to derive from their reliance on different versions of the text, which they strove to make sense of through two distinct strategies. Following up on the examination of a division of arguments by consequence along the same line in the works of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Tibetan predecessors, in particular Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150–1210) (see Hugon, in J Indian Philos 44(5):883–938, 2016b), I evaluate the diverging versions of the Rigs gter against a coherent logical scenario founded on Sa skya Paṇḍita’s discussion pertaining to the types of logical reasons in inference in the tenth chapter of his work and comparison with the classification by Phya pa. I offer a hypothesis regarding the genesis of the problematic versions of the passage on the classification of consequences in the Rigs gter based on the comparison with the classification found in mTshur ston’s epistemological work. I propose that the composition of this portion of the Rigs gter might have involved a textual reuse of mTshur ston’s classification, even though mTshur ston and Sa skya Paṇḍita disagree on background issues. This very disagreement imposed changes to the reused text that led to problematic readings.