Ryle’s Logical Geography of Perception Verbs

Abstract

Abstract Gilbert Ryle’s account of perception has not become widely known. Moreover, most of the responses to his account have been critical. Ryle’s method was to analyze our everyday use of perception verbs such as ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’, in order to argue that perception is a skill that we learn by doing. His critics concluded that by focusing on the use of perception verbs, Ryle dodged all central problems of perception. The current article aims to rebut this conclusion, by showing how Ryle’s work on perception builds on his logical-geographical method. That method leads Ryle to the conclusion that perceptual skill is a form of knowing how. Perception recipes, defined as shared criteria for correct use of perception verbs, display the normative structure of this knowledge. Although this analysis raises questions of its own, it shows that Ryle was in fact engaging seriously with core philosophical questions about the nature of perception.