Abstract
This chapter identifies the key historic and political factors, which drive Russian foreign policy toward the South Caucasus, in general, and the Karabakh issue, in particular. It traces the underlying reasons behind the periodically changing approach by focusing on the role of the history and the dynamics of the Russian elite. The historically rooted Russian perspective of the South Caucasus plays an important role in the determination of its policies. The chapter also explores the center-periphery relations to contextualize Russian foreign policy toward the Caucasus. Russia’s historic memory and the perception of the governing elite of the region as a ‘backyard’ and ‘Zakafkasia’ are key to understanding the continuity of Russian foreign policy. This study focuses on how and why Russian foreign policy and interests changed and connected external and internal factors, according to the (a) 1992–1994 First Karabakh War, 1991–1994; (b) the four-day war in 2016; and (c) the Second Karabakh War in 2020. Finally, the chapter argues that Russia’s policies on the Karabakh conflict seek not to “solve” the problem but rather “manage” it to maintain its hegemonic position. By tracing Russia’s initiatives—which vary from the ‘package plan,’ ‘step by step plan,’ ‘common state,’ ‘land swap,’ and the Madrid and Kazan Principles, the chapter argues that Russia prefers to manage the conflict in order to maintain its dominance in the South Caucasus.
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