Russia’s policy toward nuclear disarmament: A theoretical framework

Abstract

Abstract Nuclear proliferation has become a global phenomenon since 1945. A debate has emerged about whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime is sufficient to contain nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation regime has confronted new challenges in recent times. Developments stemming from the demise of the former USSR have raised few serious problems: a previously acknowledged nuclear weapon state had been subjected to political disintegration. This was a period of nuclear transformation which required long-term cooperation between Russia and the United States. This period of transition was facilitated by the foresight of policymakers from both sides of the former cold war divide and by the frameworks of arms control and disarmament agreements then in place. Ensuring nuclear stability during this period was possible because of agreements like the NPT and START. However, the other side of the story is that in January 2000, the Russian Government released its new nuclear policy in a document entitled: “Concept of National Security” which was ratified by Presidential decree on April 21, 2000. The document was updated version of policy statements made in 1993 and 1997, and indicated a heightened sense of conflict with NATO and the United States on nuclear issues, and an increased reliance on nuclear weapons. Russia rejected to adhere to the “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons policy. Russia’s nuclear policy under Putin entered a period of new realism. Russia was presented as an alternative pole to the West which gave way to new arms race. Therefore the initiative toward nuclear disarmament would most likely be largely cosmetic in nature. This chapter attempts to present a theoretical framework on Russia’s nuclear disarmament policy since early 1990s.