Russian policy towards central Asia‐I

Abstract

Moscow's diplomacy is currently faced with challenge of adjusting to post-Soviet reality all along its borders in conditions of grave economic crisis, general military decline, and political uncertainty arising from systemic transition and change. The formula prescribed by country's Foreign Minister—and now Prime Minister—Yevgeny Primakov, for country's foreign policy establishment stresses oven greater activity and vigilance on its part in order to protect country's interests in present conditions of relative weakness and vulnerability. The emphasis is on stoutly defending country'^ interests while avoiding a slide back to past policy of global confrontation with West. It seems that general pattern is aimed at evolving a mechanism of constructively engaging Russia's major interlocutors all along its borders and beyond within a mutually-agreed formal framework of talks and agreements. The country's foreign policy establishment appears to be practising what Henry Kissinger said about diplomacy, that it is the art of possible. Thus, despite its strong opposition to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Russia has signed RussiaNATO Founding Act. Moscow is willing—and working—for a layered relationship within Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) framework; closer integration is sought with those CIS countries that are more willing for it. Russia fears a geo-political threat to its historical influence in Central Asia from USA, China and Islamic militancy and fundamentalism from south. With China, Russia and three Central Asian Republics (CARs) bordering on China have succeeded in evolving a mechanism of cooperative geo-politics among border five. Despite strong concern over ,US-led multinational military exercises in Central Asia under NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, Russia has opted to participate in them. As a last resort, some virtue is'seen in keeping CARs within European