Russian Policy and the Intensification of Civil Wars in Georgia, Tajikistan and Moldova

Abstract

There are more than two million refugees in Russia, most of whom are in Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov regions. Even in the Siberian Altai region there are about 20,000 refugees roaming the Kulunda steppe in search of help. They have come from Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Tatarstan, Tula, Buryatia, Bashkiria and Yakutia. About 90 percent are Russians and the others are Germans, Ossetians, Kazakhs and Moldovans. In the vast territoryofwhat used tobe the SovietUnionand its satellites, there is clearpotentialfor manyYugoslavia-type civil wars. Many of these countries share the preconditions for armed conflict: the coliapse of strong central authority, economic crises, persistent violations of minority rights, border disputes and very limited experience with democracy. A profound economic crisis plays a significant role in intensifying social and ethnicconflicts. In the fiJ;st quarter of1992 alone, the Russian economy declined by 14 percent. An opinion poli conducted by a sociologist, Boris Grushin, in the Russian Federation, produced the following results: 80 percent of the people felt that life was better before perestroika than now; 67 percent of the respondents favoured socialism; and 50 percent of the respondents (predominantly older peopie) have favourable thoughts about Stalin.1 Under these conditions, patriotic and nationalist forces are gaining more influence and popular support. Because the economic reforms have failed to bring prosperity and stabilize the Russian economy, many active members of the democratic movement are looking for answers among the conservatives and nationalists. Ultranationalist forces attack Yeltsin's reforms. They hope to restore