Abstract

ABSTRACTRussia’s annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014 and its covert aggression in the country’s eastern regions gave it tremendous preponderance in the Black Sea region as Ukrainian Naval Forces, headquartered before the crisis in Sevastopol, left the peninsular base. Its growing brinkmanship in the Baltic airspace and waters, just as the policy of multi-layered revisionism (historical, ethno-political, international-legal) pursued in the region, spurred fears among three Baltic states and their neighbours. Seen in conjunction with the Baltic states’ long-standing “Yaltaphobia”, these developments created a basis for reconsideration of Russia’s interests and motives in the Baltic Sea region. In an attempt to disentangle such interests, this article maps Russia’s manifold geopolitical narratives along a divide between classical and critical geopolitical thinking. It concludes that the Baltic-Pontic region, although featured in both strands of geopolitical thought, has a greater prominence in Russia’s revisionist agenda rather than in its prudential, geopolitical agenda.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call