Russian-Belarusian Integration: Playing Games behind the Kremlin Walls by Alex Danilovich (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 173 On thewhole, while this book is perhaps a good description of transition in Southern Europe (Portugal, Greece and Spain), it is seriously weak in explaining major political changes that have taken place inEastern Europe. Department ofPolitics DejanJovic UniversityofStirling Danilovich, Alex. Russian-Belarusian Integration: Playing Games Behind the Kremlin Walls. Post-Soviet Politics. Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006. xiv + 234 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Appendix. Index. ?55.00. This is an engaging examination of the process of unification between Russia and Belarus, a process that has been seen by many common people in these two countries as a natural conclusion of the post-Cold War era, but failed to be realized by politicians after over thirteen years of gestation. According to the author, Russian-Belarusian integration ? in its basic legal, economic and political provisions ? 'has yet to take place, or even to advance very far' and 'has yet to be approached in earnest' (p. 162). In his book Alex Danilovich undertakes a monumental and commendable task by endeavouring to bring theoretical clarity over the issue of unification, which enjoys infinite speculations over its final cause and reasons forprolon gation. While deploying H. Milner's framework for explaining international relations through the prism of domestic politics, and that of political leadership, Danilovich effectively elucidates a possible raisond'etrefor failed integration ? that is in opposition to conventional anticipations and the manifest desire of political leadership in both countries. The book indeed blatantly ?and rather convincingly ? advances the argument that integra tion was never envisioned to succeed and instead 'was used by the Russian leadership to promote itsdomestic agenda' (p. 163). One of the unambiguous advantages of the book is its clear and rigorous style of narration. Despite a highly complex research agenda and a conten tious theoretical framework, the monograph, nevertheless, effortlessly enjoys a pace of a bestseller, so powerfully persuasive the logic and the language of narration appear to be. This is further supported by a straightforward struc ture that observes, in a professional academic manner, a theoretical frame work followed by two case-studies ? unification under El'tsin and unification under Putin ? and a concise regurgitation of the main argument in the close. The study emerges as well-researched and skilfully crafted to accommodate the author's theoretical assumptions. As a result, the book offers a sound and substantiated account of events within an adopted theoretical frame, thus yielding a plausible explanation of 'what has actually happened and why integration attempts failed' (p. 162). Although understandably prioritizing the domestic agenda and motives of Russian political leadership ? 'humongous' Russia vis-a-vis 'puny' Belarus ? in an attempt to explain the failure of unification, the author inadvertently, however, propounds certain limitations to his study. By only 174 SEER, 87, I, JANUARY 200g considering a 'Russian-driven' perspective, the author loses a wealth of evidence on the Belarusian side that otherwise could have only enriched his study. In his introduction, Danilovich briefly elucidates the reasons for excluding Belarus from his systemic analysis suggesting that the latterbehaves more like a unitary actor 'whose domestic forces seem to overwhelmingly sup port unification with Russia' (pp. 7-8). The statement is,however, erroneous, resulting in exclusion of an influential player from a two-country game, who ? ifnot in size ? has been equally challenging the pace of integration and itsfinale, which the author contradictorily admits to in the concluding chapter of the book (p. 166). By considering one side of the story the study, unfortunately, remains somewhat incomplete. Finally, although elegandy and persuasively undertaken, the study suffers from someminor inaccuracies and ambiguities. These include: confusion over the use of the verb 'affect' (pp. 2; 82); confusion in relation to the destiny of a 'sacked' or voluntarily 'retired'Vice Prime Minister Egor Gaidar (p. 41); confusion over the Belavezha agreement signed by the presidentsof Russia, Belarus and Ukraine [...] in 1991 (the presidency in Belarus was only insti tuted in 1994) (p. 43); an unclear historical account of the Belarus National Assembly (p. 116); lack of unification in the spelling of some names: Jirinovsky (p. 165) or Zhirinovsky (p. 166 and elsewhere). At times,Danilovich's commentary dips into tabloid journalism, resorting to some popular statements like 'in Europe, it is...