Russia Returns to the Middle East: 2005-2011

Abstract

The Maghreb Review, Vol. 36, 2, 2011 © The Maghreb Review 2011 This publication is printed on longlife paper RUSSIA RETURNS TO THE MIDDLE EAST: 2005-2011 BY ROBERT O. FREEDMAN∗ INTRODUCTION During his first term in office [2000-2004] Russian President Vladimir Putin took a basically defensive position in the Middle East, much as his predecessor Boris Yeltsin had done1 . With an economy still recovering from the devastating collapse of 1998 [although oil prices, critical to the Russian economy, had begun to rise], with an ugly insurgency still raging in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, and with his domestic opposition still not yet fully suppressed, Putin adopted a cautious policy in the region and elsewhere in the world as well. To be sure, in the case of Iran, Putin did abrogate the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement of 1995, under which Russia promised to end all arms sales to Iran by the end of 1999. Nonetheless, he also took an increasingly critical position toward Iran’s nuclear programme, once Iran’s secret facilities for the enrichment of uranium were discovered, even threatening, in June 2004, to hold up the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor which Russia was building in Iran2 . In the case of the US invasion of Iraq, Putin took a strongly critical position, but one that was also shared by America’s NATO allies, France and Germany3 . In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Putin continued the proArab tilt begun under Yeltsin when Yevgeny Primakov had become Russia’s Foreign Minister in 1996. 4 In part, Putin’s position seems to have been related to his efforts to curry favour with the Arabs so as to try to get them to limit their aid to the rebellion in Chechnya, which by the late 1990’s had taken on a clear Islamic nature. Indeed, one of Putin’s policy innovations during his first term as Russia’s President was to seek the support of Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] for his policies in Chechnya, and in 2003 he applied for observer status in the organization, basing his claim on the fact that there were 20 million Moslems living in the Russian Federation.5 Another policy ∗ John Hopkins University. I am indebted to my research assistant at Johns Hopkins University, Mr. Alex Shtarkman, for his research input in this article. 1 For an overview of Russian policy toward the Middle East under Yeltsin, see Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy Toward The Middle East Since The Collapse Of The Soviet Union: The Yeltsin Legacy And The Challenge For Putin [Seattle: Henry Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington,1991] 2 For a detailed analysis of Russian-Iranian relations from 1991-2006, see Robert O. Freedman, Russia, Iran And The Nuclear Question: The Putin Record [Carlisle, Pennsylvania: the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College,2006] 3 Putin’s strategy during the war is discussed in, Robert O. Freedman, “Can Russia be a Partner for the United States in the Middle East?”, in Nato-Russian Relations [ed. Aurel Braun] [New York: Routledge, 2008] 4 Freedman, Russian Policy Toward The Middle East, op. cit 5 Freedman, Can Russia be a Partner, op cit 128 ROBERT O. FREEDMAN continuity from the latter part of the Yeltsin era was the attempt to improve Russian-Turkish relations. Indeed, in 2000 Putin called for the transformation of relations with Turkey from competition to cooperation, and trade between Russia and Turkey was to rise rapidly, based in large part on Russian supplies of natural gas to Turkey and the construction of the “Blue Stream” natural gas pipeline across the Black Sea under an agreement signed by the two countries in 1997. By June 2004, with his domestic opponents under control, overwhelmingly reelected to a second term as Russia’s President, with oil prices rising rapidly and the Russian economy showing major signs of improvement, Putin was ready to move ahead with his three major objectives for Russia; [1] restoring Russia’s status as a great power, thereby ending American dominance of the post-Cold War world; [2] developing the Russian economy, particularly in the high-tech area, so Russia would not be so dependent...