Russia and the EU: a new Framework for Russian Domestic and Foreign Policies

Abstract

Despite numerous problems in EU-Russian relations?the growing gap in Russian-Western security perceptions, challenges to Russian and EU internal evolution, mutual dissatisfaction and deceived expectations?stability in wider Europe remains their common interest. The EU wants to secure stability in the east; Russia wants the same in the areas west and south of its borders. This cannot be achieved in the absence of integration of the two partners in the military-political sphere, just as it was impossible in the past to ensure Western Europe's security without rapprochement and integration between France and Germany. The crisis over South Ossetia has become the embodiment of all problems accumulated in the post-bipolar Europe. Of all Russia's partners only the EU has taken on the difficult task to mediate in that conflict and, as after the 1999 Kosovo crisis, to reduce the gap between Russia and the West. However, the Caucasus conflict and especially Moscow's recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence have increased differences within the EU on the so-called Russian factor and made it necessary for the EU leadership to define its strategy vis-?-vis Russia; this will strongly shape Europe's security landscape. RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS: STILL AT THE CROSSROADS Crisis as a turning point In spite of Russia and the EU having common interests in many spheres?particularly in the international security and energy sectors?and continuing intensive contacts, including the Russia-EU summits, one of the most fashionable topics in academic discussions today is whether there is a crisis in the relations between the two partners. If one defines a crisis as the threat of collapse in EU-Russia relations, there is no crisis, because the interdependence of the two partners is rather high. Even during the This article was originally presented at the conference 'Russia's global perspective: defining a new relationship with Europe and America', held at the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, 23 November 2007. Authors' e-mail: arbatova@hotmail.com Irish Studies in International Affairs. Vol. 19 (2008), 33-42. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.35 on Wed, 31 Aug 2016 04:45:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 34 Irish Studies in International Affairs Cold War, the USSR and the West were able to cooperate in many spheres, notably in trade and arms control, but it made little difference to the overall nature and character of their relationship. If we agree to define a crisis as a turning point, a condition of uncertainty leading to a decisive change, we should recognise that there is a crisis in EU-Russia relations due to an absence of clear strategic goals and mutual trust. The partners have approached a fork in the road and it is unclear whether they will travel together or take divergent paths. The crisis has not arisen overnight. Many of the problems that have appeared in Russia-EU relations after the disintegration of the USSR have acquired a qualitative character. The expectations of each side with regard to the other have not been fulfilled. The EU expected that Russia would build a functioning democracy and introduce market economy reforms overnight. Russia expected cooperation with the European Union to deliver an economic miracle and help it find a proper place in post-Cold War Europe. As I see it there exist three imperatives for the Russia-EU partnership, three groups of problems and three policy recommendations. IMPERATIVES FOR COOPERATION Economic and energy interests No doubt, there exist sound interests for EU-Russia economic and energy cooperation. Russia is the European Union's third-largest trading partner. Between 2000 and 2006 the export of goods from the European Union's current 27 member states more than tripled in value to 72.4 billion. Imports from Russia to the EU over the same period have more than doubled to 140.6 billion.1 Russia is an important external energy supplier to the European Union, currently accounting for over 25% of its oil and gas deliveries. The EU will remain Russia's most important energy export market and European companies are Russia's most important foreign investors.2 Moreover, all scenarios show that the EU's energy imports will continue to grow significantly. According to some estimates, the EU's dependence on external energy supplies by 2030 will be 81% of its oil consumption and 93% of its gas consumption.3 However strong these economic interests are, it would be worthwhile to remind ourselves that even during the Cold War, the USSR and the West maintained an equitable relationship and cooperated in several areas despite a simmering hostility. Therefore, a great deal will depend on how the EU will assess Russia's role. If Russia is only fcgas and oil' for the EU, there won't be any real partnership. Too heavy an emphasis by the EU on energy security creates the impression that the EU is not interested in partnership with Russia in other spheres.