Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through Cold Peace to Partnership? by Martin A. Smith (review)

Abstract

reviews 591 Smith,Martin A. Russia and NATO sinceiggi: From ColdWar ThroughCold Peace to Partnership? Roudedge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics. Routledge, London and New York, 2006. 163 pp. Notes. Index. ?70.00. For the last fifteenyears,Martin A. Smith's substantial, erudite and articu latework has helped to better understand European security. In the present volume, Smith puts together a concise and accessible review of the main events between Moscow and NATO, updating his analysis to cover the aftermath of Bush and Blair's war on Iraq and the many-coloured (but unequally fortunate) civil revolutions recently staged inGeorgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Drawing from the ample English academic literature available on its subject and fromdifferentpost-Soviet press digests, Smith theoretically locates the NATO-Russia problem between two key coordinates: the question of what Russia wants and the question ofwhat NATO is.Although thiswork is not directly concerned with the sources of Russia's foreign policy (he has considered thesemore systematically inprevious writings), one of Smith's most useful contributions is his illuminating genealogy of the 'common European home' idea ? a foreign policy narrative deployed by Russia under differentguises since the 1950s, and geared towards legitimizing a preferential place for itself in any design of Europe's security. The common European home was again unsuccessfully articulated during the nineties, partly as an attempt to offsetNATO enlargement and drive a wedge between Western Europe and the US which, according to Smith, conform a kind of loose 'transatlantic normative community'. In this way, Smith not only interprets the past, but dares point a cau tious fingerat where Russia and NATO might be heading. In his view, their relationship can safelybe described as a pragmatic partnership, 'based mainly on [their] expedient and tactical calculations' and really only operative when these interests are perceived to coincide (p. 127).As Smith himself admits, this is a rather conservative conclusion. A pragmatic partnership embodies the natural minimum of co-operation that could be expected between Russia and NATO at any time. But even though Smith is sceptical thatRussia will ever form an integral part of his loose transatlantic normative community (where co-operation stems from shared liberal values and democratic practic es), he nevertheless does not rule out the emergence of a strategic partnership. This would involve a deeper and longer-term cooperation, and would be predicated on a shared understanding of the sources of international instabil ity and conflict, though not on shared norms and values. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC), operative since 2002, has succeeded in setting Russian and allied minds on the same wave-length with regards to issues such as terrorism orWeapons ofMass Destruction. For Smith, therefore, theRNC could yet be the egg whence a strategic partnership might hatch (p. 128). Smith's text delves deep into the contradictions and hidden endeavours inside Russia's attitude's towards theAlliance but, disappointingly, tends to suspend that same critical stance when considering NATO's actions. Smith's Russia often appears insecure and obsessed with its superpower status, while 592 seer, 86, 3, july 2008 NATO's self-styledrole as a liberal organization generally sensitive toMos cow's 'irrational suspicions' goes mosdy unquestioned. A telling instance can be found in the chapter on Kosovo. Here, Smith approvingly quotes a report published by an Independent International Commission, to support the thesis that 'itwas Russia's rigid commitment to veto any enforcement action' at the UN Security Council which became 'themajor factor forcing NATO into unmandated action' (p. 8o). It isvery difficult to see how Russia's dissenting position could force anyone to go it alone in Kosovo, unless one assumed (perhaps righdy), thatwar was on the allied agenda regardless ofRussian or Chinese qualms. Smith also observes that 'by earlyJuly 1999 it was clear thatRussia-NATO relations had survived theKosovo crisis intact, if far from in rude health' (p. 80), but many readers will recall those events unfolding rather less harmo niously. This is not the only instance where Smith tends to underplay con flict,concentrating almost exclusively on the notion of partnership. Russia's relations with theWest have, pace Smith, worsened considerably over the lastmonths in disputes increasingly involving energy, space, influence and profits...