Abstract
<p>Russell (in <em>Principles of Mathematics</em>) and Wittgenstein (in <em>Tractatus</em><br /><em>Logico-Philosophicus</em>) largely agree on the twin questions of why pairs of<br />congruent objects cannot always be made to coincide and why surfaces<br />can never be uniformly two colours at once. Both philosophers take<br />space and colour to be mathematically representable, construe the relevant<br />impossibilities as mathematical and hold that mathematical impossibility<br />is at root logical. It is not by chance that Russell says nothing<br />about the phenomena in his Introduction to the Tractatus or surprising<br />that Wittgenstein was unmoved by the objection that his account of colour<br />incompatibility puts paid to his early philosophy.</p>
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