Russell and Frege on the Power of Symbols and the Compositionality of Linguistic Expressions

Abstract

This paper discusses two prima facie unrelated topics of contrast and comparison between Russell and Frege. The first topic is the importance of logical symbolism; I focus primarily on remarks by Frege in Begriffsschrift (1879) and other early writings and on Russell’s lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918), respectively. I argue that while Russell’s main concerns were the capacity of symbols to “fit” and adequately represent the components and structure of the symbolized reality, Frege’s concerns were focused on the relationships between symbols and the conceptual or informational content they symbolize and on the power of symbolic expressions in engendering the grasping of their contents. The second theme focuses on the thesis supported by both Russell and Frege that the composition of linguistic expressions representing Russellian facts or Fregean thoughts, respectively, corresponds to the complexity of the thoughts and facts that those linguistic expressions represent. I submit that the contrast of emphases between Russell’s and Frege’s views on the power and significance of symbols, which I outline in the first part of this paper, provides a useful hypothesis to explain how a Russellian “metaphysical” reading of the complexity of linguistic expressions might have prevented a more accurate “epistemological” interpretation of Frege’s remarks on the compositionality of logical and ordinary language.