Rules of Dialogue: Seven Lessons from the Negotiations Between Europe and Greece

Abstract

The second chapter analyses the negotiations over debt restructuring between Athens and Brussels in the five months of February to July 2015 and shows how the Europeanist and democratic illusion of the Syriza leaders of Greece led them to ignoring the similarities between what we can call the rules of dialogue and rules of war—both characterised by specific dynamics of power. In this context, the chapter discusses the respective stands of the parties to the negotiations. It argues that a greater awareness of the complexities of the realities of the crisis was essential for Greece to engage with the financial and political might of the euro zone and corporate Europe as a whole. Part of the delusion and consequently ignorance of the rules of dialogue and war came from the belief of the Left that there was no alternative to Keynesian policies, and thus what Greece immediately needed was more money to tide over the crisis. We can thus speak of an elective affinity between rules of dialogue and rules of war. Its awareness will help us understand why in a span of only twenty days—24 June when the negotiations entered the dramatic phase to 14 July—history witnessed two unforgettable nights: the night of glory, 5 July and the night of ignominy, 14 July.