Rule skepticism: Searle's criticism of Kripke's Wittgenstein

Abstract

For almost fifty years now, Ludwig Wittgenstein's reflections on rule-following (Wittgenstein 1953: §§138–242) have been one of the most controversial topics in analytic philosophy. Saul Kripke's book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Kripke 1982, subsequently WRPL) is the best-known and most provocative interpretation of this difficult material. Almost all leading analytic philosophers working in philosophy of mind and language have commented on Kripke's interpretation (cf. Kusch 2006). In this chapter I shall assess John Searle's contribution to this ongoing discussion. The key text is Searle's “Skepticism about Rules and Intentionality” (Searle 2002: ch. 14, subsequently SRI), an essay in which Searle attacks Kripke's book head on. Although SRI was written in the early 1980s, it was not published until 2002. The time of writing explains why SRI makes no reference to any other contribution in the extensive “Kripkenstein debate.” Searle charges Kripke with misunderstanding Wittgenstein's ideas and he maintains that Kripke's interpretation leaves Wittgenstein with a weak and unconvincing position. I shall seek to defend Kripke on both scores.