Rule-Based Detection of False Data Injections Attacks against Optimal Power Flow in Power Systems.

Sani Umar,Muhamad Felemban

doi:10.3390/s21072478

Sani Umar, Muhamad Felemban

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.3390/s21072478

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Abstract

Cyber-security of modern power systems has captured a significant interest. The vulnerabilities in the cyber infrastructure of the power systems provide an avenue for adversaries to launch cyber attacks. An example of such cyber attacks is False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA). The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the impact of FDIA on the cost of power generation and the physical component of the power systems. Furthermore, We introduce a new FDIA strategy that intends to maximize the cost of power generation. The viability of the attack is shown using simulations on the standard IEEE bus systems using the MATPOWER MATLAB package. We used the genetic algorithm (GA), simulated annealing (SA) algorithm, tabu search (TS), and particle swarm optimization (PSO) to find the suitable attack targets and execute FDIA in the power systems. The proposed FDIA increases the generation cost by up to 15.6%, 45.1%, 60.12%, and 74.02% on the 6-bus, 9-bus, 30-bus, and 118-bus systems, respectively. Finally, a rule-based FDIA detection and prevention mechanism is proposed to mitigate such attacks on power systems.

Highlights

Smart power systems are complicated cyber-physical systems
Throughout our simulation studies, we found that the value of False Positive (FP) is zero for all the standard bus systems under investigation, this means that our detection mechanism never indicates the presence of an attack when there is no actual attack happening in the system
Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is one of the most important modules in power systems that ensure the optimal operation of power systems

Summary

Introduction

Smart power systems are complicated cyber-physical systems. An example of such a system is the modern power systems, which consist of physical infrastructure and cyberinfrastructure. The cyber infrastructure includes the telemetry and the communication equipment connected to the power systems. The cyber components help in enhancing decision-making and monitoring of the power systems. Cyber components, such as meters, are used to measure parameters, such as the load demand of a particular node (i.e., bus), within the power system network. We present a classification of attacks based on the attack execution (Figure 1). We present state-of-the-art mechanisms to detect data integrity attacks in power systems.

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