Abstract
A family of allocation rules for cooperative games with a priori unions is introduced in this paper. These allocation rules, which will be called rough Shapley values, are extensions of the well-known Shapley value for classical cooperative games. The family of rough Shapley values, which is constructed by using rough sets to describe different cooperative options, includes several of the extensions of the Shapley value found in the literature. We prove that the rough Shapley values are the allocation rules for games with a priori unions that satisfy some reasonable properties.
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