Rotfeld, Adam Daniel and Torkunov, Anatoly V. (eds) White Spots — Black Spots: Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations 1918–2008 (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 557 Vasyl Rasevych’s chapter on the Galician Ukrainians shows how reluctant they were to liberate themselves from Habsburg tutelage, even in late 1918. Georgiy Kasianov provides an excellent overview of the ups and downs of the various Ukrainian governments after 1917, ending his account of ‘the Ukrainian Revolution’ in ‘November 1920, when Ukrainian troops engaged in the Soviet-Polish war retreated to Galicia’ (p. 76). There are many excellent maps, particularly in the material on military campaigns. Wolfram Dornik is sceptical that the occupation of Ukraine by the Central Powers in 1918 was anything but ‘a fiasco for all those involved’ (p. 399). He also raises the question of ‘whether the Central Powers were well-advised when they overthrew the Rada’ (p. 400) in April 1918. Peter Lieb and Wolfram Dornik are interesting on why the Habsburgs deferred to the Germans during the occupation (p. 62). ‘A Ukraine under the protection of Vienna was seen as a possibility, but the Austrians were realistic enough to know that it was not very likely. Their real fear was that Kyiv would come under the influence of Russia or Germany, and this would put strategic pressure on the Danube Monarchy’ (p. 403). Hannes Leidinger and Wolfram Dornik provide an excellent analysis of the (lack of) interest shown by the Allied Powers towards Ukraine, particularly after the end of the war in the West in November 1918. Bogdan Musial is very good on the vicissitudes of Poland’s policy, and on Piłsudski’s genuine desire for a ‘cessation of attacks on Petliura’ (p. 377) in 1919 and ‘attempt to restore Ukrainian statehood’ (p. 382) in 1920. This is an ideal book for students, containing as it does both summary chapters and in-depth detail where needed. But there is also much to interest the specialist. UCL SSEES Andrew Wilson Rotfeld, Adam Daniel and Torkunov, Anatoly V. (eds). White Spots — Black Spots: Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations 1918–2008. Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies. Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 2015. xi + 666 pages. Notes. Appendices. Index. $65.00. This is a remarkable book, not so much for its insights drawn from new historical research but as an important document of collaborative PolishRussian efforts to remove from their contemporary political relationship conflicts over ‘difficult matters’ in their common twentieth-century history. The Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters was originally formed in 2002 on the initiative of both governments, but suffered a false start due to renewed tensions in their relations. The Group was revived in 2008 and its composition SEER, 94, 3, july 2016 558 significantly altered, bringing together individuals from a variety of academic disciplines, professional fields and government agencies to ‘support state institutions in addressing those problems from the past that hinder mutual relations and inhibited their development’ (p. 5). The 2008 ‘reset’ would produce concrete results, including fifteen paired Polish-Russian perspectives from thirty-one contributors on their bilateral relations over a ninety-year period, of which the English-language edition under review is an abridge version of the Polish and Russian originals. Led by the former Polish foreign minister, Adam Daniel Rotfeld and the Russian academician and former diplomat Anatoly V. Torkunov, the Group could also claim credit for inspiring the joint 70th anniversary commemoration of Polish officers shot and killed in the Katyn Forest by the NKVD in April 1940. To be sure Katyn has been the most difficult of all matters, beginning with the crime itself, followed by decades of denial and obfuscation on the Soviet side and bitterness and resentment from the Poles. An early breakthrough occurred in March 1990 with the publication of an article in Moskovskie Novosti by Natalia S. Lebedeva, one of the contributors to this volume. Lebedeva’s ‘bombshell’ revelation of Katyn documents was followed three weeks later by an official statement in which the highest Soviet authorities admitted the responsibility of the NKVD for the murders. However, the most important materials remained hidden until October 1992, when authorized copies of the top secret folders of the Politburo related to the decision to execute the Poles in captivity were turned over to then Polish President Lech Wa...