Romantic guilt and identity

Abstract

There is a kind of guilt that looks archaic, but which arises at the moment of Romanticism. One way of understanding it is as a response to a plight bequeathed by Kant. Kant's account of the subject secures the subject as such, but not the particular individual. The particular individual for Kant presents a risk, the risk of turning away from the good will defined by the categorical imperative to embrace one's own, particular good. Ultimately for Kant this entails the risk of radical evil. The peculiarity of Romantic guilt is that it seems to grant one ontological assurance for one's particular individuality. This paper explores and seeks to define the phenomenon of Romantic guilt as a possible aspect of tensions in lived experience, in particular between the universalism and moral autonomy associated with the rationalist, Enlightenment strain in liberalism, and the particularism and rootedness of cultural belonging associated with Romanticism. Romantic guilt emerges as having a constitutive function in relation to the self. The paper concludes with suggestions about ways in which further research might trace Romantic guilt in a collective form in nationalism and modernity.