Abstract

The breakdown of short-term funding markets was a key feature of the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. Drawing on ideas from global games and network growth, we show how network topology interacts with the funding structure of financial institutions to determine system-wide crises. Bad news about a financial institution can lead others to lose confidence in it and their withdrawals, in turn, trigger problems across the interbank network. Once broken, credit relations take a long time to re-establish as a result of common knowledge of the equilibrium. Our findings shed light on public policy responses during and after the crisis.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.