Role Of Underwriters In Restraining Earnings Management In Initial Public Offerings

Abstract

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">We investigate the </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;">relationship</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> between underwriter</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;"> reputation</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> and earnings management of IPO firms over the period of 1991-2005. We find that </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;">IPO firms engage in less earnings management</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> if </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;">they</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> are underwritten by prestigious investment bankers. Furthermore, the role of prestigious underwriters in restraining earnings management of IPO issuers do not change during the Internet Bubble period or after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The findings support the certification role of underwriters in the IPO process.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We also document that</span><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN;"> firms going public in the post-SOX period engage in less earnings management compared to firms going public in the pre-SOX period</span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">. Further findings suggest that the changing objectives of venture capitalists may explain the reduction in the level of earnings management of IPO firms following the passage of SOX.</span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>