Abstract
This paper examines the application of the regulatory contract in the practice of economic concentration regulation from the standpoint of the theory of incomplete contracts. Based on the identification of transaction costs that arise at different stages of the conclusion and implementation of the contract, the limited rationality of both parties (including the regulator) is found. That leads us to the incompleteness of the contract. The involvement of the trustee institution in the regulatory contract is associated with the regulator's desire to remove some of the problems caused by the incompleteness of the contract (to minimize errors of type I and II under conditions of limited rationality). The risks associated with the use of the institution of trustees in regulatory contracts are also identified. Theoretical conclusions are then demonstrated on the empirical examples from Russian and foreign antitrust regulation practices. Reviewed cases: Bayer/Monsanto (2018); Anheuser-Busch Inbev / SABMiller PLC (2015); BASF/Cognis (2010).
Highlights
This paper examines the application of the regulatory contract in the practice of economic concentration regulation from the standpoint of the theory of incomplete contracts
Based on the identification of transaction costs that arise at different stages of the conclusion and implementation of the contract, the limited rationality of both parties is found
The involvement of the trustee institution in the regulatory contract is associated with the regulator's desire to remove some of the problems caused by the incompleteness of the contract
Summary
Заключение регуляторного контракта, как и любого другого контракта, сопряжено с трансакционными издержками. Эти издержки могут серьезным образом влиять на результативность контракта с точки зрения целей конкурентной политики (Joskow, 2002). В силу ограниченности бюджета антимонопольному органу приходится решать задачу оптимизации структуры трансакционных издержек и сталкиваться с дилеммой рисков ошибок I и II рода. С нашей точки зрения, регулятор, как и другая сторона контракта, характеризуется в своем поведении ограниченной рациональностью, поскольку не обладает достаточной информацией о «переменных» контракта для решения оптимизационной задачи ex ante. В этом и состоит природа «неполноты» (Hart, 1995) заключаемого регуляторного контракта. Мы руководствуемся классификацией трансакционных издержек, предложенной в работах (Tirole, 1999; Segal, 1999)
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