從羅蘭巴特（Roland Barthes）的符號學解讀「公務人員退場機制」的意義

Abstract

Abstract Our national performance rating system in Taiwan has always been severely criticized by civil servants and professional academics. During the past decades, the Examination Yuan launched a series of ad hoc research projects to address the improvement of the performance rating system, yet none of the legal demerits was properly mended under such reformatory operations. It is therefore understandable why issues related to the performance rating and the exit mechanism for civil servants have always been a major concern in the society. This year as the domestic market bears the full attack from a global economic crisis in which all businesses languish, the unemployment rate reaches an all-time high and all citizens share a sense of dissatisfaction about government policies, the Examination Yuan proposes in a high-profile news release that a new ‘Civil Servants Exit Mechanism’ will be implemented soon in order to weed out all underperformed civil servants. In this thesis, the ‘Civil Servants Exit Mechanism’ proposed by the Examination Yuan will be regarded as an encoded sign based on the Roland Barthes’ symbolism, and a further analysis will also be made on the denotation of the language level as well as on the three cultural significances of the myth level (connotation, myth and symbolism). In fact, the Civil Service Performance Rating Act has already provided for an exit mechanism because it regulates a dismissal for level of performance rating Grade-D civil servants. Therefore, what the Examination Yuan does is like playing a hackneyed tune or placing old wine in a new bottle. Nothing is changed but the old casing. On a second thought, even though certain novelties have been incorporated into this new version of the civil servants exit mechanism and it certainly is a very good reform idea, legal provisions alone cannot make the new version work. Entangled interests, intervening ideologies, and the autonomy of signs and the complex network will all prevent a forced working policy from reaching its ideal goals. Based on these above mentioned reasons, the author thus concludes that the proposal of a new civil servants exit mechanism is a bluff; that is, it carries more myth and symbolism than connotation. However, shall we instead continue with a delaying tactic under the risk of a performance rating system collapse without ever attempting a reform? As the author believes, only when there is a tremendous amount of power generated from history, doubled by certain accompanying measures, more campaigns, and more supports from all sides, will a reform slogan such as that proposed by the Examination Yuan ever achieve success.