Roger That: Russia’s Coup-Proofed Army and Its Combat Effectiveness, 2022–2023

Abstract

ABSTRACT Contrary to expectations, Russia failed to overrun the Ukrainian defense despite its apparent preparations for the 2022 invasion. This paper delves into the unexpected outcome, attributing it to the Russian army’s inadequate combat effectiveness. It, in turn, was triggered by President Vladimir Putin’s coup-proofing strategies, namely granting large payrolls and funding for the military; tolerating lucrative dealings and corruption; establishing military fiefdoms; counterbalancing; rotation and purges of politically disloyal officers; and micromanaging military campaigns. Cumulatively, these policies curtailed military autonomy, accelerated promotions of inept loyalists, limited interbranch cooperation, provoked high attrition rates, and spread norms of coercion toward military personnel, making the Russian army’s performance suboptimal during combat. Discussing the issue, the article advances four plausible explanations for why Putin resorted to coup-proofing.