Rocks, frogs, and the cartesian gulf: Toward a naturalism of persons

Abstract

Rychlak and Winegar have raised a number of pertinent and useful questions concerning the model outlined in “The Influence of Early Experience on Personality Development” (Bickhard & Christopher, 1994). Most of these questions address metaphysical assumptions or possible assumptions made in the course of the arguments-either to seek clarification ofwhat those assumptions might be, or to challenge what those assumptions seem to be. As such, these questions force further elucidations of the metaphysics within which the discussion proceeds. Rychlak and Winegar correctly see that the metaphysics of the model is not standard in contemporary psychology, and that, consequently, it requires probing and challenging to see how well it satisfies-or dissolves, or avoids, or fuil.s to satisfyvarious meta-metaphysical criteria (usually these are criteria that we already know are failed by standard approaches). I welcome these questions and the opportunity they provide to clarify further the metaphysical framework within which the model of the influence of early experience is situated. I am resigned to the certainty that my replies will be inadequate, especially given the limitations of time and space, but I will attempt to make some positive contributions, even if fragmentary, toward the issues raised.