Robust Realism in Ethics

Abstract

AbstractRobust Realism in Ethics: Normative Arbitrariness, Interpersonal Dialogue, and Moral Objectivity defends a robustly realistic metaethical theory. It argues that, in order to capture the normative non-arbitrariness of moral choice, we must commit to the existence of robustly stance-independent, categorical, irreducibly normative, non-natural moral facts. It then shows that, by exploring the nature of interpersonal moral dialogue, robust realists can defend epistemological and meta-semantic theories that are friendly to their view. Specifically, the book defends a dualistic form of moral intuitionism on which some moral beliefs are justified on the basis of a priori intuitions, whilst others are justified on the basis of a posteriori moral experiences. And it offers a theory of ‘moral mental files’ to explain how moral terms and concepts are able to refer to robust moral facts.