Robust Large-Scale Spectrum Auctions against False-Name Bids

Abstract

Auction is a promising approach for dynamic spectrum access in cognitive radio networks. Existing auction mechanisms are mainly strategy-proof to stimulate bidders to reveal their valuations of spectrum truthfully. However, they can suffer significantly from a new cheating pattern, named false-name bids, where a bidder can manipulate the auction by submitting bids under multiple fictitious names. We show such false-name bid cheating is easy to make but difficult to detect in dynamic spectrum auctions. To address this issue, we propose ALETHEIA, a novel flexible, false-name-proof auction framework for large-scale dynamic spectrum access. ALETHEIA not only guarantees strategy-proofness but also resists false-name bids. Moreover, ALETHEIA enables spectrum reuse across a large number of bidders, to improve spectrum utilization. Following that, we extend ALETHEIA to its general version that supports more practical and flexible auction, where bidders accept the spectrum allocation under their partial satisfactions. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that ALETHEIA achieves both high spectrum redistribution efficiency and auction efficiency.