Abstract
One rival account of fundamentality is based on Kit Fine’s notions of ground and reality. But ground violates purity (if it is taken to be fundamental); and the reality‐based account is holistic in an unexplanatory way. Another rival account is based on truthmaking. But truthmaking is an unsatisfactory foundation for a theory of fundamentality since objects are truthmakers and objects are too coarse‐grained a foundation for metaphysical explanation. A final rival is based on Jonathan Schaffer’s notion of entity‐grounding. But again, entities are too coarse‐grained a foundation for metaphysical explanation. Friends of grounding and truthmaking can introduce distinctive entities ‐ states of affairs ‐ that are fine‐grained enough to explain, but at the cost of positing further fundamental facts.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
