Abstract
本文採用Brander-Spencer(1985)兩出口國與一進口國的基本模型，來探討當此三國政府皆不知道兩出口廠的成本時，在進口國采行不同的關稅制度下，兩出口國出口補貼政策的Nash均衡。在線性市場需求及高低兩種成本類型的假設下，本文發現當進口國采行單一關稅制度，兩出口國均提供單一出口補貼，而當進口國采行歧視性關稅制度，兩出口另均課徵單一出口稅。本文亦發現進口國的最適關稅制度為單一關稅制度，但只要兩出口廠商的預期成本差距夠小，兩出口國均偏好歧視性關稅制度。
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