Abstract

We assess the impact of contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds and the wealth transfers they imply conditional on conversion on the risk-taking behaviour of the issuing bank. We also test for regulatory arbitrage: do banks try to maintain risk-taking incentives by issuing CoCo bonds, when regulators reduce them through higher capitalisation ratios? While we test for, and reject sample selection bias, we show that CoCo bonds issuance has a strong positive effect on risk-taking behaviour, and so do conversion parameters that reduce dilution of existing shareholders upon conversion. Higher economic volatility amplifies the impact of CoCo bonds on risk-taking.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.