Abstract

In international relations, the last three decades have been marked by national and institutional fragmentation. The fate of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and the regrettable way that events played out (especially in the former case), could befall other federative entities as well. Canada and Belgium come to mind, as do countries like Spain, all of which effectively function as federations. However, while federations usually have dispute settlement and mechanisms for secession embedded in their constitutions, sub-constitutive territories are often excluded from such considerations. What territories such as Kosovo, Sandjak, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, etc. have in common is that they share a desire for independence from their parent country. However, achiveing independence would present risks to the territorial integrity of other countries (what can be termed the domino principle), as well as risks to the endurance of flexible international law. The cases we have alluded to above culminated in the Crimean crisis. The problems between Estonia and the Russian Federation stem from the choice of precedent and founding text on which to base the former’s renewed independence. While Estonia was founded on the basis of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty that put an end to the country’s War of Independence, its experience as a Soviet Republic added another legislative filter in the form of the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union. However, the principle of uti possidetis had evolved to apply to more than cases of colonialism. Thus, when Estonia seceded from the USSR with the borders it had been since 1945, it was doing so under the principle of uti possidetis. The current dispute stems from the fact that the Estonian political elite seek to have the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty recognized as the foundational document for the country’s renewed independence. Under the Treaty, Estonian sovereignty applied over a much larger territory. By insisting that any new border arrangement with Russia be based on that Treaty, Estonia is invalidating the principle of uti possidetis and the validity of the Constitution of the Soviet Union as a vehicle for independence. It implies a latent Article 5 situation between NATO and Russia, and threatens the legitimacy of other post-Soviet secessions.

Highlights

  • President of the Estonian Riigikogu and member of the Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, EKRE) suggested that the Russian Federation should return the portion of territory east of the Narva River and Petseri to Estonian sovereignty, as called for by the treaty signed between independent Estonia and the nascent Soviet Union in the city of Tartu, in 1920

  • The big question motivating scholars at the time of the unveiling of the 1977 Constitution was whether continuity would prevail or whether the new legislation would be put into force effectively, especially with regard to Article 6, so that “all organisations of the Party operate within the Constitutional framework of the USSR.”[4]. This would apply to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and to the organs and agencies of constitutive Union Republics as well, such as the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, and that of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

  • It is no surprise that Estonia might feel buoyed by the example provided by the two great powers, and that it is engaging in a kind of legal jettisoning of its own

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Summary

Introduction

There is “one Soviet nation,” but Article 72 of the Constitution still allows for secession.[3] The big question motivating scholars at the time of the unveiling of the 1977 Constitution was whether continuity would prevail or whether the new legislation would be put into force effectively, especially with regard to Article 6, so that “all organisations of the Party operate within the Constitutional framework of the USSR.”[4] This would apply to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and to the organs and agencies of constitutive Union Republics as well, such as the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, and that of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. If the secession of the Baltic States was aimed at righting the wrongs of illegal annexation and recovering the independence and sovereignty they had won at the end of the First World War, they could only do so with what the 1977 Constitution provided and within the practice of uti possidetis

How the Tartu Peace Treaty Enables the Erosion of Uti Possidetis
How the Lost Hegemony of the United States Empowers Small States
Conclusion
Findings
Сведения об авторах
Full Text
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