Abstract
Cooperation is generally the most advantageous strategy for the group; however, on an individual level, cheating is frequently more attractive. In a fishery, one can choose to cooperate by fishing only the regulated amount or not to cooperate, by fishing to maximize profits. Top-down management can help to emulate a cooperative result in fisheries, but it is costly and not always a viable alternative for development states. Here, we investigate elements of a fishing system that can be strategically managed to encourage a cooperative behaviour. Using bioeconomic data, we modelled an evolutionary game between two populations of fishers that differ if they cooperate or do not cooperate with a fishing restriction. We penalized players including risk tolerance and control perception, two social parameters that might favour cooperation. We assessed the degrees to which risk tolerance and control perception affect the cooperative behaviours of fishers in a restricted fishing effort small-scale fishery (RSSF) in southern Brazil. We also assessed the likelihood of a scenario wherein a cooperative strategy can evolve and dominate the system. We identified dominance and coexistence outcomes for the RSSF. Sensitivity analyses suggested that both control perception and risk tolerance could facilitate a cooperative outcome for the fishery.
Highlights
It is widely accepted that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ [1] or the ‘tragedy of free for all fishing’ [2] is the core of the issue in a Malthusian overfishing perspective [3]
When risk tolerance is high, there is an evident effect of control perception upon cooperative outcomes
This study focused on the interactions of risk tolerance and control perception with the bioeconomic aspects of restricted fishing effort small-scale fishery (RSSF)
Summary
It is widely accepted that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ [1] or the ‘tragedy of free for all fishing’ [2] is the core of the issue in a Malthusian overfishing perspective [3]. For all individuals in a cooperative situation, there is a more attractive choice: cheating [6] This paradox presents a dilemma for stakeholders in social-ecological systems: how to deal with cheaters? Independent of the scale, this dilemma waylays fishers, decision-makers, researchers, and all of those concerned about building a sustainable way to fish [7,8]. Cooperative behaviour in this complex conflict, can be explored through evolutionary game theory to discern tendencies or produce predictions concerning each agent’s choices [9]
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
