Abstract
<abstract><p>In this paper, a continuous-time insider trading model is investigated in which an insider is risk-seeking and market makers may receive partial information on the value of a risky asset. With the help of filtering theory and dynamic programming principle, the uniqueness and existence of linear equilibrium is established. It shows that (ⅰ) as time goes by, the residual information decreases, but both the trading intensity and the market liquidity increases, and (ⅱ) with the partial observation accuracy decreasing, both the market liquidity and the residual information will increase while the trading intensity decreases. On the whole, the risk-seeking insider is eager to trade all the trading period, and for market development, it is necessary to increase the insider's risk-preference behavior appropriately.</p></abstract>
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