Risk management with tournament incentives

Abstract

The convex payoff structure in professional golf rewards scoring volatility, giving rise to player types who succeed in spite of higher average scoring. The same risk incentives should influence all players to adjust risk strategies at key moments in tournaments when payoffs either crystallize or become particularly convex. This paper develops a simple theoretical framework, then explores the empirical evidence for strategic risk adjustment by players over the 2003–2012 PGA Tour seasons. Findings suggest that players respond measurably on average to risk incentives around the cutline, but much less so (if at all) to leaderboard position on the closing holes of a tournament. Both the payoff to risk and the technical capacity of players to add or subtract risk are estimated. Analysis of individual players indicates that some elite players are more risk responsive. Bias (e.g., loss aversion) is discussed along with other possible explanations for the apparent lack of risk response over the closing holes of a tournament.