Risk Disclosure Policies: A cross-sectional analysis of the Greek Banking Industry

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the under-researched Greek banking market; inadequate transparency and disclosure about exposures has led to counterparty concerns and renewed strains in bank funding markets. Greek banks, now struggling with the need to increase provisions against bad debts, asset write-offs and with problems of liquidity as a result of being frozen out of the interbank lending market are completely reliant on the European Central Bank. The study examines the impact that Basel II had on the risk disclosure practices in the Greek banking sector. The disclosure practices and their potential relationship with size, risk profile and profitability of the most actively traded Greek banks are examined. In 2010, the latest wave of outcry from investors surfaced, demanding the disclosure of information showing how Greece and Greek banks used derivatives to hide their deficits when Greek banks entered into a large number of private, offmarket swaps from 2001 through 2007. There is a compelling public interest in relevant information being disclosed. The results show that inadequacies still exist despite the fact that Basel II managed to raise the risk disclosing amounts in the annual reports of the Greek banks. The informational content of the disclosures is suspect, due to that little quantitative information is disclosed; favouritism towards qualitative and past related disclosures is revealed. Furthermore, no quasi-norms between the size, profitability or risk profile of the institutions and their risk disclosing quantities is revealed. Dr. Rosemary Skordoulis Principal London School of Business Management London, WC1E 7JN UK Disclosing policies and the quantity of disclosures have evolved, throughout the examined period in the Greek banking industry; yet, transparency issues and quality problems are still present owing to the high degree of secrecy of the internal Greek market.