Risk communication in the aftermath of the World Trade Center disaster.

Abstract

The attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) was an unprecedented disaster that resulted in a tragic loss of human life and environmental exposures that were unlike any prior experience. At the outset, government agencies rushed to reassure the public with announcements of ‘‘safety’’ that were based on limited information. The experience of the public ran contrary to the government pronouncements; acrid smells, clouds of smoke and soot, and what has been termed the ‘‘World Trade Center Cough.’’ Public confidence declined in the government’s data and environmental assessments of safety. As a result of this, some environmental and health agency representatives seemed more reticent to speak at public meetings or to the press, thus compounding public fears and uncertainty. In the days and weeks that followed, the public turned more to alternative sources of information in order to evaluate the veracity of government statements. Physicians, occupational medicine specialists, academics, environmental consultants, and the residents living near the site were asked for their opinions. Differing assessments of shortand long-term dangers appeared in the media and caused further uncertainty and fear. In the absence of directly applicable environmental guidelines or limits for such disaster situations, some in the press inappropriately applied short-term exposure measurements to long-term standards for contaminants such as lead, dioxin, and asbestos, and thereby heightened public fears that still exist in Lower Manhattan.