Abstract
AbstractOn-demand insurance products cover risks for short periods of time via a smartphone or other electronic device. Such insurance contracts give policyholders the freedom to choose when to be insured in a flexible way. On-demand contracts may change the way risk is perceived. Therefore, we conduct an experiment and show that individuals can become exceptionally risk-averse when offered short-term insurance. We show two main reasons for this result: first, the underlying risk is often overestimated by the subjects due to a miscalculation of the loss probabilities. Second, the shorter valuation horizon of on-demand insurance contracts leads to myopic loss aversion.
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