Abstract

Much was debated in the past years about the causes of the financial crisis which was triggered by the collapse of the US real estate market and the implied huge losses in complex-structured credit securities by large financial institutions, mostly banks. The crisis also reveals fundamental failures in the measurement, management, and transfer of risk in the financial system as well as methodological weaknesses (to say the least) in the regulation of financial institutions. Much has been learned about the (il-)liquidity of markets and its self-reinforcing effects, but the real problem is deeper.

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